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in the limited terms of the "container" theory. The addition of the
excessive test would meet the expectations of coverage that most purchasers of fire insurance have.
Nothing would be gained by abolishing the "friendly-hostile" fire
dichotomy instead of enlarging the definition of "hostile fire"; on the
other hand, new complications might arise. The English court in
Austin v. Drew8 8 and the Massachusetts court in Way v. Abington
Mutual Fire Ins. Co." shared the concern voiced by the Maryland

court in American Towing Company v. German Fire Ins. Co.:
The subject of the policy is a steam-tug, her boiler and other
machinery. Of necessity, fire was to be maintained in the furnace,
and in contact with the boiler, . . . and it [the fire] was placed
there to act upon the boiler, which, in course of time, would be
38
by the continued action of fire thereon.
burnt out or warped ....
Clearly, the court was concerned with the normal wear and tear on
the boiler and furnace, since such damage is not within the scope of a
fire insurance policy. The addition of the excessive test would not
result in the fire insurer having to pay for the normal wear incident to
the usage of a boiler, furnace or other fire container.3 9 Similarly, an
insured who hid her jewelry in the stove and later inadvertently lit
a fire should perhaps not recover4 ° for the damage to the jewelry. But
it is submitted that loss from excessive but contained fires are within
of the average insured 4 and should, therefore, be
the contemplation
42
compensable.

Liability Under Defectively

Organized Corporations

Cranson v. International Business Machines Corp.'
Cranson was asked to invest in a new corporation in April, 1961,
and agreed to purchase stock and become an officer and director. The
business was operated as a corporation, Cranson acting at all times
as a corporate officer. However, due to an oversight on the part of
the company attorney, of which defendant was not aware, the certificate
36. 4 Camp. 360, Holt. N.P. 126, 171 Eng. Rep. 115, 171 Eng. Rep. 187, 6 Taunt.
436, 2 Marsh 130, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1815).
37. 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
38. 74 Md. 25, 33, 21 Atl. 553, 554 (1891).
39. Insurance companies have had little difficulty in computing the rate of depreciation on other types of property, and there is no reason why this principle could not
be applied to fire containers.
40. See Weiner v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N.Y.S.
279 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N.Y.S. 935 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
41. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
42. The clear case for no recovery, damage to the container by a non-excessive,
non-escaping fire, would still not be compensable under the excessive test.
1. 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964).
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of incorporation, which had been acquired and acknowledged prior
to May 1, 1961, was not filed until November 24, 1961. Between
May 17 and November 8, the corporation purchased eight typewriters
from plaintiff, for which only a portion of the purchase price was
paid. Plaintiff sued defendant Cranson personally rather than the
corporation, on the theory that the corporation had not come into
existence due to the failure to file the certificate of incorporation. The
Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant Cranson appealed.
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that in a case
such as this, no personal liability should attach to the officer of a
corporation. In an opinion by Judge Homey, the court surveyed the
Maryland cases on point, discussing both the doctrine of de facto
corporations and the invocation of estoppel to deny corporate existence.
The court said, "It is not at all clear what Maryland has done with
respect to the two doctrines. There have been no recent cases in this
state on the subject and some of the seemingly irreconcilable earlier
cases offer little to clarify the problem."' The Maryland cases were
divided into two classes: (1) those which refused to apply either
the de facto or the estoppel doctrines where there was a failure to
comply with a condition precedent to corporate existence, but applied
the doctrine of estoppel where the noncompliance concerned a condition subsequent to incorporation;' and (2) those which ignored the
distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent,
utilizing instead the doctrine of estoppel when the course of conduct
between the parties was on a corporate basis.' The court went on to
hold that since the plaintiff in this case dealt with the company as if it
were a corporation and relied on its credit instead of on Cranson,
plaintiff was estopped to assert that the company was not incorporated
at the time the typewriters were purchased.
It is a general rule that one who deals with an apparent corporation in such a manner as to recognize its corporate existence is
2. Id. at 481, 200 A.2d at 34. The court also says in note 2 of the decision that
inexcusably, the briefs of counsel were for the most part of no practical use in
arriving at a decision of the intricate questions of law presented here. It does not
appear that they were particularly limited by what counsel presented in arriving
at a decision.
3. Generally, failure to comply with a condition precedent to the existence of a
corporation will result in a finding that the corporation is not a legal entity and
cannot be sued as such. See, e.g., National Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman, 110 Md.
313, 73 At. 19 (1909) ; Maryland Tube and Iron Works v. West End Improvement
Co., 87 Md. 207, 39 Atl. 620 (1898) ; Boyce v. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church,
46 Md. 359 (1877). In these cases neither de facto nor estoppel theories are used to
sustain the existence of the corporation.
On the other hand, when corporate existence has been attained but there has
been a failure to comply with certain conditions subsequent, the corporate existence
remains stable, and no individual liability attaches. See, e.g., Murphy v. Wheatley,
102 Md. 501, 63 Atl. 62 (1906) ; Hammond v. Straus, 53 Md. 1 (1880).
4. See, e.g., Pott & Co. v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 Atl. 592 (1897) ; Grape,
Sugar & Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Small, 40 Md. 395 (1874). These cases appear to say
that where the parties have assumed corporate existence and dealt with each other
on that basis, the courts will apply the estoppel doctrine, preventing the parties from
questioning the company's corporate existence.
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estopped to deny the corporate existence.5 The rule can apply to
either of the contracting parties, by estopping the corporation shareholders from denying corporate existence,8 or by estopping persons
dealing with the company from denying its corporate existence. 7
The doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence is used
primarily in the absence of either de jure or de facto existence. In
order to have a de facto corporation, there must have been a bona fide
effort to incorporate, an actual exercise of corporate powers, and a
valid law under which a corporation could be formed.9 In the principal
case, for example, it is doubtful that de facto corporate existence would
have been accorded the company, because the failure to file the certificate of incorporation would probably be a failure to make a bona fide
effort at incorporating.'" Estoppel, then, appears to have been the
logical doctrine on which to base the ruling that no individual liability
would attach to the defendant in this case. But two early Maryland
cases, Maryland Tube & Iron Works v. West End Imp. Co." and
National Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman, 2 ruled that the doctrine of
estoppel could not be invoked unless a corporation had at least a
de facto existence.1" Since this would have precluded the use of the
estoppel doctrine in the present situation, the court took the opportunity to expressly overrule these two cases. They stated:
There is, as we see it, a wide difference between creating a
corporation by means of the de facto doctrine and estopping a
party, due to his conduct in a particular case, from setting up the
claim of no incorporation. Although some cases tend to assimilate
the doctrine of incorporation de facto and by estoppel, each is a
distinct theory and they are not dependent on one another in their
application."
5. On estoppel generally, see 18 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations §§ 74-80 (1965);
18 C.J.S. Corporations§§ 108-19 (1939) ; Note, 14 CALIF. L. Rxv. 486 (1926) ; Note,
31 TxNN. L. RZv. 336 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Seaton v. Grimm, 110 Iowa 145, 81 N.W. 225 (1899); Carozza v.
Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 139 At. 332, 43 A.L.R. 1 (1925);
Kingsley v. English, 202 Minn. 258, 278 N.W. 154, 115 A.L.R. 654 (1938) ; Bennett v.
Baum, 90 Neb. 320, 133 N.W. 439 (1911).

7. See

BALLXNTINE,

CORPORATIONS

§ 34 (1946); 8

FLSTCHtR, CORPORATIONS

§ 3910 (1959). Also see Bushnell v. Consolidated Ice Machine Co., 138 Ill. 67, 27
N.E. 596 (1891); Newcomb-Endicott Co. v. Fee, 167 Mich. 574, 133 N.W. 540 (1911);
Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Owen, 37 Okla. 616, 133 Pac. 193 (1913).
8. A de jure corporation is one organized in substantial conformity to the applicable statute and one whose right to exercise the corporate function is unassailable.
Mackey v. N.Y., N.H.&H. Ry. Co., 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583, 586 (1909); Parks v.
James J. Parks Co., 128 Neb. 600, 259 N.W. 509, 510 (1935).
9. See Parks v. James J. Parks Co., 128 Neb. 600, 259 N.W. 509 (1935);
Asplund v. Marjohn Corp., 67 N.J. Super. 255, 168 A.2d 844 (1961); 8 FLrCHZR,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 3763; 18 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations §§ 49-56 (1965).
10. The fact that the court felt that they had to decide whether estoppel could be
applied in the absence of the elements of a de facto corporation is indicative of the
fact that there could be no de facto corporation here.
11. 87 Md. 207, 39 Atl. 620 (1898).
12. 110 Md. 313, 73 At. 19 (1909).
13. Other cases having the same requirement for employing the estoppel doctrine
are Jones v. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263, 40 Pac. 457 (1895); Puro Filter
Corp. v. Termbly, 266 App. Div. 750, 41 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1943); James v. Unknown
Trustees, 203 Okla. 312, 220 P.2d 831, 20 A.L.R.2d 1077 (1950).
14. 234 Md. at 487, 200 A.2d at 38.
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This view has substantial support. Fletcher has stated, "The
doctrine of a de facto corporation has nothing to do with the principle
of estoppel. Such a corporation cannot be created by estoppel, and, on
the other hand, may exist although no elements of an estoppel are
present."'" Also, there is ample case authority to the effect that estoppel
is not limited to cases of de facto corporations."6 Thus, by overruling
precedent to the contrary, the Maryland Court of Appeals has freed
the estoppel doctrine from the bonds of de facto requirements and has
placed Maryland with the majority of states employing the estoppel
doctrine.
However, the Maryland court in the principal case, by relying on
the doctrine of estoppel to reach its decision, refused in effect to join
the modern trend toward departing entirely from both the de facto
and the estoppel doctrines. The authorities following this trend have
been strictly applying their statutory requirements for incorporation.
Every state has by statute marked the point at which corporate existence
begins. The Maryland Corporation Statute, section 131, reads in part
as follows:
Upon acceptance for record by the Commission [now the
State Department of Assessments and Taxation] of any articles
of incorporation, the proposed corporation shall, according to the
purposes, conditions and provisions contained in such articles of
incorporation, become and be a body corporate by the name therein
stated. Such acceptance for record shall be conclusive evidence of
the formation of the corporation except in 7a direct proceeding by
the State for the forfeiture of the Charter.'
This section must be read, for purposes of this case, in conjunction
with section 31 (a) of the Corporation Act :"s
A subscriber to, or a holder of, stock of a corporation shall be
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect
15. 8 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 3763. See also 18 Am. JuR. 2d Corporations § 74 (1965): "It is generally conceded that corporations by estoppel are not
based upon the same principles as are corporation de facto. The doctrine of de facto
corporations has nothing to do with the principle of estoppel."
16. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co 161 Ga. 524, 131 S.E. 517 (1926);
Marshall-Wells Co. v. Kramlich, 46 Idaho 355, 267 Pac. 611 (1928) ; Gardner v.
Minneapolis and St. L. Ry. Co., 73 Minn. 517, 76 N.W. 282 (1898); Pearson Drainage Dist. v. Erhardt, 239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484 (1947).
17. MD. CODA ANN. art. 23, § 131(b) (1957). Maryland is the only state requiring filing with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation. Most states
require filing with the Secretary of State. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODA ANN. § 308
(1947); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.5(2) (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2-4 (1939);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 403 (1963). Some states require filing with both the Secretary of State and the county in which the principal office of the corporation will be.
See, e.g., ARIK. STAT. ANN. § 64-102 (1931); DAL. CODA ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (1949).
Others require filing only with the county. See, e.g., LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 12:5
(1950) and TENN. CODS ANN. § 48-110 (1932). Several states require filing in the
office of a judicial officer. See, e.g., ALA. Bus. CoaP. AcT! § 10-21(6) (1959) and
GA. CODS ANN. § 22-1813 (1937-38). A great number of states provide that corporate existence begins with the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by the
Secretary of State. See, e.g., D.C. CODS ANN. § 29-921(c) (1954); W. VA. CODS
ANN. § 3020 (1923) ; TSx. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 3.04 (1955).
18. MD. CODS ANN. art. 23, § 31(a) (1957).
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to such stock, except to the extent of any (1) that the subscription
price or other agreed consideration therefore has not been paid
and (2) that any liability may be imposed pursuant to any other
provision of this Article.
Bearing in mind that the primary question here is whether limited
liability has attached to corporate shareholders and officers, it can be
seen that section 131 must be read together with subsection (2) of section 31 (a) as the failure to comply with section 131 is obviously one of
the provisions imposing the liability in question. As such, the question of whether the incorporation process has been properly carried out
will be determinative of liability, and a sound interpretation of the
statute becomes essential.
In the past, the requirements for corporate existence in the various
states have not been strictly enforced. Though they are clearly set
forth, it seems that as long as some effort is made to incorporate and
the parties carry on a relationship on a corporate basis, the importance
of the statutory requirements diminishes. This is particularly true in
the states recognizing the de facto and estoppel doctrines.
The cases concerning a failure to file corporation papers particularly emphasize whether or not the dealings between the parties were
transacted on a corporate basis. 9 Most cases are in agreement that
personal liability will be imposed where there was no attempt to act
as a corporation.2" But even where there is activity conducted on a
corporate basis, the cases seem to be split as to whether or not personal
liability will attach as a result of the failure to file corporate documents.21 Where there has been no attempt at incorporation at all, i.e.,
a complete disregard of the conditions precedent, most courts have
imposed individual liability.22 Of course, in these cases there could be
no de facto corporate existence due to a failure to make any bona fide
effort at incorporation. Any findings for the defendant would have
to be made on the theory of estoppel, and the courts have been reluctant
to do this.23
19. The cases are collected in Annots., 22 A.L.R. 376 (1923) and 37 A.L.R. 1319
(1925). A good discussion of the cases appears in Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De
Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. Riv. 1153 (1952).
20. See, e.g., Owen v. Shepard, 59 Fed. 746 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Bigelow v. Gregory,
73 Ill. 197 (1874); Bank of De Soto v. Reed, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 102, 109 S.W.
256 (1908).
21. For cases imposing personal liability, see, e.g., Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187
(8th Cir. 1909); Harris v. Ashdown Potato Curing Ass'n, 171 Ark. 399, 284 S.W.
755 (1926); Campbell v. Rukamp, 260 Mich. 43, 244 N.W. 222 (1932) ; Federal
Advertising Corp. v. Hundertmark, 109 N.J.L. 12, 160 At. 40 (1932). For cases in
which liability attached to the corporation and the individuals were exonerated, see,
e.g., Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392 (1879); Tisch Auto Supply Co. v. Nelson,
222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923); Mason v. Stevens, 16 S.D. 320, 92 N.W.
424 (1902).
22. See, e.g., Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 189 Ga. 250, 5 S.E.2d 739 (1939)
Amer. Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Condon, 280 Mass. 517, 183 N.E. 106 (1932); PuroFilter Corp. v. Trembley, 266 App. Div. 750, 41 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1943) ; Perrine v.
Levin, 123 N.Y.S. 1007 (1910).
23. In the states requiring multiple filing, the cases seem to be split, although
filing with the Secretary of State seems to be more important than filing with the
more localized registrar. The defendants were personally liable where they filed in

1966]

CRANSON V. INTERNATIONAL

Bus.

MACHINES CORP.

359

The estoppel and de facto doctrines have come under attack by
many writers on the subject. For example, in discussing de facto
corporations, one commentator has said that, "[N]othing is gained
or clarified by including the statement that the association 'is a de
facto corporation' or that it 'is not a de facto corporation'. . .
Consequently, the statement ...that the association is or is not a 'de
facto' corporation is literally nothing more than a somewhat obscure
' 24
way of stating that the associates do or do not enjoy limited liability.
The de facto doctrine has served only to make the point at which
corporate existence begins confusing and unpredictable.2 5 As Ballantine
has stated, it has resulted in a "conglomeration
' of judicial decisions
[presenting] a discouraging and baffling maze. 26
The attack on the estoppel doctrine is based upon the absence of
representation, one of the essential elements of an estoppel. 27 The doctrine can properly be applied to estop an association, which holds itself
out as a corporation, from denying its corporate existence in an action
against a third party. But in the case of a corporation seeking to defend
itself, the doctrine cannot properly be applied, since the third party made
no representation at all. In these cases, the courts which apply the estoppel doctrine employ the fiction of "estoppel by conduct," saying that the
third party should be estopped merely because he interacted with the
corporation under the pretense that it was properly incorporated.29
However, there is no real need for the courts to resort to such
fictions.8" Without the doctrine of estoppel, the burden of defective
incorporation would fall where it should on the incorporators
themselves. The persons who sought to insulate themselves' from
individual liability through the use of a corporation, and not third
parties, should bear the responsibility of seeing that the statutory
requirements for incorporation are met. Forcing third parties to
examine incorporation records every time they deal with a corporation would place an unreasonable burden on them and an unjustified
encumbrance on commercial activities.
the proper county though not with the Secretary of State in Morse v. Burkart Mfg.
Co., 154 Ark. 362, 242 S.W. 810 (1922) and Heisen v. Churchill, 205 Fed. 368 (7th
Cir. 1913). They were not liable in Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 23, 203
S.W. 6 (1918); Doty v. Patterson, 155 Ind. 60, 56 N.E. 668 (1900); Burstein v.
Palermo, 104 N.J.L. 414, 140 Atl. 326 (2928); Vanneman v. Young, 52 N.J.L. 403,
20 Atl. 53 (1890). Where the parties filed with the Secretary of State, the defendants were not personally liable in Newcomb-Endicott Co. v. Fee, 167 Mich. 574, 133
N.W. 540 (1911) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Fohey, 111 Miss. 654, 71 So. 906 (1916) ;
Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Owen, 37 Okla. 616, 133 Pac. 193 (1913). But in
all the multiple filing cases, in which the corporation was held rather than the individual defendant, all transactions were carried out on a corporate basis.
24. Frey, supra note 19, at 1178. The doctrine also comes under attack in Warren,
De Facto Corporations,20 HARv. L. PUv. 456, at 468 (1907).
25. See Note, 43 N.C.L. Rv. 206, 207 (1964).
26. BALLANTINE , op. cit. supra note 7, § 20, at 71 (1946).
27. See, e.g., Dodd, Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARv. L. Rv.
521, 553 (1927); Lewinsohn, Defective Corporations, 13 MIcH. L. Rzv. 271 (1915).
28. See, e.g., Alco Finance Co. v. Moran, 178 Okla. 575, 63 P.2d 747 (1936);
Cavaness v. General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
29. See, e.g., McGuire v. Blessing Co., 275 Ky. 622, 122 S.W2d 513 (1938);
Springfield Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 293 S.W.2d 189 (1956).
30. It should be noted that the estoppel doctrine is not without its proponents.
See Note, 43 N.C.L. Rzv. 206 (1964).
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Still, there is no denying the possible injustice of refusing to
apply the estoppel doctrine. The main case is a prime example, for it is
evident that a refusal to apply estoppel and the consequent personal
liability of Cranson would penalize him for the negligence of his
attorneys. To all intents and purposes, the parties dealt with each
other as if a corporation existed, with Cranson merely an agent of it.
To hold Cranson liable as an individual, merely because of the failure
of the corporation's attorneys to file the certificate of incorporation,
appears to work great injustice. It is against this possible injustice
that a repudiation of the estoppel doctrine must be weighed. Though
Cranson is not without remedies of his own - he could still maintain
an action against the attorneys - the initial loss would fall on one
who was not really guilty of any negligence or fault.
The modern view tends to depart from using the de facto and
estoppel doctrines altogether, placing primary emphasis on the literal
requirements for incorporation set out in the corporation statutes.$'
The Model Business Corporation Act is indicative of this."2 Under
this act, corporate existence would commence upon the issuance of the
certificate of incorporation. In the comment to this section, it is said
that "since it is unlikely that any steps short of securing a certificate
of incorporation would be held to constitute apparent compliance, the
possibility that a de facto corporation could exist under such a
83
'
provision is remote.
Robertson v. Levy3 4 is a recent judicial pronouncement departing
from the traditional de facto and estoppel doctrines. In that case,
plaintiff sued defendant individually on a note, refusing to sue the
corporation since there had been a failure to incorporate in accordance
with the provisions of the District of Columbia Corporation Act, 5
which was based on the Model Act. The trial court ruled for defendant
based on the estoppel doctrine, as in the principal case, but the decision
was reversed. The appellate court stated, "One of the reasons for
enacting Modern Corporation Statutes was to eliminate problems
inherent in de jure, de facto, and estoppel concepts. ' 38 The opinion
then went on to add:
The corporation comes into existence only when the certificate
has been issued. Before the certificate has been issued, there is no
corporation de jure, de facto, or by estoppel. After the certificate
is issued . . , the de jure corporate existence commences. . . . It
is immaterial whether the third person believed he was dealing
with a corporation or whether he intended to deal with a corporation. The certificate of incorporation provides the cut-off point;
before it is issued, the individuals, and not the corporation, are
liable."
31. HORNST4IN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTicE § 26 (1959).
32. MOD&L BusINEss CORPORATION AcT ANNO. § 50 (1959).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid., comment to § 50.
197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1964).
Business Corporation Act, D.C. CODz §§ 29-921 (c) (1961).
197 A.2d 443, 446.
Id. at 446-47. For views similar to this one, see HORNSTEIN, op.

note 31, § 29 and Frey, supra note 24, at 1180.

Cit.

Supra
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It is unfortunate that in light of the confused state of Maryland
case law and the comprehensive scope of the modem Maryland Corporation Act, around which new case law could be built, the doctrine of
estoppel was used to decide Cranson. With an obvious trend pointing
in the direction of the Model Act and Robertson v. Levy, this would
have been an ideal opportunity for a Maryland judicial pronouncement
in this direction. It is most probable that in drafting the Maryland
statute, the drafters were aware of the unpredictable and confusing
law surrounding the problem of defective corporations and desired a
result similar to that reached by the Model Act 8 and the Robertson
case. Unfortunately, it appears that section 131 of the Maryland
Corporation Act still lacks the strength of a literal interpretation, and
the same problem which has weakened prior statutes and has led to
wide-spread use of the de facto and estoppel doctrines will continue
to dominate this area of corporation law in Maryland.

Wife's Right To Recovery For Loss Of Consortium
Due To The Negligent Injury Of Her Husband
Baldwin v. State1
Plaintiff's husband sustained injuries when the truck he was
operating was struck by the defendant's railway locomotive. Plaintiff
and her husband brought suit alleging that the defendant was negligent
in the operation of the locomotive. The husband sought to recover for
personal injuries sustained, while the plaintiff-wife sought to recover
for the loss of the consortium of her husband. Upon motion of the
defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff-wife.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the lower court
and held that the plaintiff-wife had no right to recover for loss of
consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband.2
Consortium is the "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and
the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the
other in every conjugal relation."3 Although this definition implies
that this right is reciprocal between the spouses, the law has failed to

accord husband and wife equal treatment where there has been a loss
of consortium caused by a defendant's negligence. While a husband is
allowed to sue for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of
his wife,4 the majority of the courts deny the wife the same cause of
action when her husband has been negligently injured.5
38. See note 30 supra.
1. 215 A.2d 492 (Vt. 1965).
2. Id. at 494.

3.

BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY

(4th ed. 1951).

4. See 27 AM. JuR. Husband and Wife §§ 501-02 (1940) ; 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 401 (1944).

5. See 27 Am. JuR. Husband and Wife §§ 513-14 (1940)
Wife § 404 (1944).

41 C.J.S. Husband and

